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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government’s power to punish crimes has drastically
expanded in the past few decades as improved telecommunications
and transportation networks have turned more crimes into interstate
1
affairs. This expansion of the federal government’s authority to
regulate crime conflicts with the traditional division of power, in
2
which states regulate most crimes. The tension between the federal
government’s law enforcement authority and its limited powers is
3
apparent in United States v. Comstock. This case is about how far the
Constitution will allow the federal government to go in preventing
crime. In Comstock, the Supreme Court will consider whether the
federal government has the authority to indefinitely civilly commit
4
sexually dangerous federal offenders who are already in federal
5
custody. At the heart of Comstock is a question of whether Congress
has the power to civilly commit prisoners as “sexually dangerous”
regardless of whether they are imprisoned for committing a sex crime.

* 2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Counterrevolution—National Criminal Law After Raich, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 986 (2005) (stating that “there has been a veritable explosion in the number
of federal criminal laws over the last half century”); Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing
Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 826 (2000) (estimating that there are more than
3600 federal crimes, 40% of which have been enacted since 1970).
2. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (describing state authority to protect
the community from the mentally ill; see also Ehrlich, supra note 1, at 826–27.
3. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
2828 (2009).
4. See infra notes 23 and 24 and accompanying text (defining sexually dangerous).
5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (I), United States v. Comstock, No. 08-1224 (U.S. Apr.
3, 2009).
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Congressional power to civilly commit potentially dangerous
people is limited by the Necessary and Proper Clause because the
6
Constitution does not explicitly authorize civil commitments.
Congress can only provide for civil commitments when they are
necessary and proper to an action justified by one of Congress’
7
enumerated powers. Whether Congress had the power to provide for
civil commitment of the sexually dangerous could ultimately depend
on which power the Court holds that Congress’ action was founded
on. If the Court holds that the civil commitment law is based on
Congress’ commerce power, the law will probably be unconstitutional
because sexual dangerousness falls outside the scope of the
Commerce Clause. If the Court holds that the law is founded on
Congress’ penal power, the law will probably be constitutional
because civil commitment is necessary and proper to the function of a
federal penal system.
II. FACTS
Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
(the “Act”) with the aim of “protecting children from sexual
8
exploitation and violent crime.” Section 4248 of the Act authorizes
the federal government to civilly commit any sexually dangerous
person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in a federal
9
facility.
United States v. Comstock consolidates five individuals’
10
constitutional challenges to the Act. The lead plaintiff, Graydon
11
Comstock, pled guilty to receipt of child pornography. Six days
before the end of his thirty-seven month prison sentence, the
Attorney General certified him as sexually dangerous and stayed his
12
release from prison. The cases of three of the four other parties
(Markis Revland, Thomas Matherly, and Marvin Vigil) followed a
similar trajectory; the government certified each for civil commitment

6. See U.S. CONST., art I § 8 (ommitting civil commitment from the list of enumerated
powers).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 17.
8. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No 109-248, 120 Stat.
587, 587 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248 (West 2009).
10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 9.
11. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2009) cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
2828 (2009).
12. Id.
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less than one month before each man completed his prison term.
More than two years after the expiration of their prison terms, all four
are still in the medium security Federal Correctional Institute in
14
Butner, N.C.
The fifth respondent, Shane Catron, was found incompetent to
15
stand trial on charges of sexual abuse of a minor. After he was
committed for treatment and evaluation to determine his likelihood
to attain competency for trial, the government concluded that he
16
could not be restored to competency. The government then moved
to commit him under § 4248 as a person suffering from mental
17
disease.
Each respondent moved to dismiss on constitutional grounds,
relying on the government’s lack of authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the federal power to prosecute and prevent
18
criminal conduct, and the Commerce Clause. The Eastern District of
North Carolina agreed, holding that § 4248 was not sufficiently tied to
19
an enumerated power.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. §4248 and Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person
Section 4248 authorizes the government to civilly commit
“sexually dangerous” federal prisoners and other “sexually
20
dangerous” people in federal custody, a power that permits the
federal government to extend the imprisonment of people it believes
will commit sex crimes in the future. Under § 4248, three categories of
people are subject to civil commitment: 1) those in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons; 2) those committed to the custody of the U.S.
Attorney General based on incompetence to stand trial; and 3) those
who have had their charges “dismissed solely for reasons relating to

13. Id. at 277–78.
14. Id.
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 10.
16. Id. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(d) (West 2009) (describing procedure for
“determination of mental competency to stand trial to undergo postrelease proceedings”).
17. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 10; see also § 4246 (describing the
procedure for “hospitalization of a person due for release but suffering from mental disease or
defect”).
18. United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 530–40 (E.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d 551 F.3d
274 (4th Cir. 2009).
19. Id. at 559.
20. § 4248(a).
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21

the[ir] mental condition.”
Civil commitment under § 4248 begins with a finding by the
Attorney General that a qualifying prisoner or detainee is sexually
22
dangerous. To qualify as sexually dangerous, the prisoner or detainee
must have “engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent
23
conduct or child molestation” and “[suffer] from a serious mental
illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have
serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child
24
molestation if released.” The Attorney General can make these
findings even if the prisoner or detainee has not been convicted of a
25
sex crime.
Once the Attorney General determines that a prisoner is sexually
dangerous, the prisoner’s release from federal custody is stayed and
26
proceedings to review the Attorney General’s determination begin.
The prisoner is entitled to counsel, and can testify, present evidence,
subpoena witnesses, and confront and cross-examine witnesses who
27
appear against him at the hearing. If the government proves by clear
and convincing evidence that the individual is sexually dangerous, the
prisoner is committed to the civil custody of the U.S. Attorney
28
General, where he will remain until: 1) a court determines that he is
not sexually dangerous; 2) a court determines that he will not be
sexually dangerous to others if released under an appropriate care
regimen; or 3) the state in which he is (or was) domiciled agrees to
29
take custody of him. Thus, the federal government does not decide
whether the person remains in federal custody; if the state assumes
responsibility, the prisoner must be relinquished to state custody for
30
the state to try or imprison him.
B. Justification for §4248.
The government justifies §4248 in two different ways. First, it says
that § 4248 is necessary and proper to Congress’ authority to enact

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
§ 4247(a)(5).
§ 4247(a)(6).
United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id.
§ 4248(c).
§ 4248(d).
Id.
§ 4248(g).
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laws regarding subjects within its enumerated powers. Second, the
government contends that Congress’s power to operate a federal
penal system includes the power to civilly commit dangerous
32
offenders within the penal system.
Under the first argument, Congress must show that it has the
authority to regulate sexually dangerous acts. The most logical source
33
of authority to do so is the Commerce Clause. To regulate sexually
dangerous acts under the Commerce Clause, Congress must show that
34
sexually dangerous acts substantially affect interstate commerce.
Whether Congress can show that is unclear in the wake of the
35
Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Morrison and
36
Gonzales v. Raich.
The Court’s Morrison decision, standing alone, tends to indicate
37
that Congress cannot regulate sexual violence. In Morrison the
Supreme Court articulated a four-factor test to determine an activity
38
is substantially related to interstate commerce. The Court looks at
whether the regulated activity is economic in nature: if it is, the
39
activity is more likely to fall under the commerce power. The
Morrison test also asks whether the statute’s reach is limited by an
express jurisdictional element; the activity is more likely to be within
the scope of the commerce power if the statute contains a
40
jurisdictional limitation. The Court held that the Commerce Clause
did not give Congress the power to give all victims of sex crimes a
federal cause of action because sexual violence was not an activity

31. Brief for the United States at 17, United States v. Comstock, No. 08-1224 (U.S. Aug.
28, 2009).
32. Id. at 22.
33. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause CounterRevolution? 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 880, 890 n.79 (2005) (criticizing the Court’s post1942 “‘channels’ and ‘instrumentalities theories’” of the Commerce Clause as allowing Congress
to regulate anyone or anything that could move across state lines).
34. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
35. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
36. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005); see also Miles Coleman, Note, Unwanted
Advances: Civil Commitment and Congress’s Illicit Use of the Commerce Clause —United States
v. Comstock, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1217, 1226 (2009). (describing the scholarly divide over whether
Raich contradicts or elaborates on the Rehnquist’s prior Commerce Clause decisions).
37. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–16 (discussing gender-motivated violence as too
attenuated to interstate commerce to be regulated by Congress under the Commerce power).
38. See id. (holding that the civil remedy of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority because violence against women did not substantially
affect interstate commerce).
39. Id. at 610.
40. Id. at 611.
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that substantially affected interstate commerce. In so holding, the
Court explicitly rejected Congressional findings that sexual violence
42
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Though the
Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to create a cause
of action for all victims of sex crimes, the Court indicated that it might
give Congress the power to provide a cause of action of victims of
43
interstate sex crimes.
The Court’s decision in Raich, however, indicates that certain
activities that would generally be called noneconomic can still be
regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause if the regulation
44
is part of a broader regulatory scheme of interstate commerce. The
Court held that even though marijuana was being grown for personal
consumption, Congress could regulate it because regulation was
necessary to protect the federal government’s effort to eliminate the
45
market for illegal drugs. The Court also held that legislative action
taken under the Commerce Clause is presumed constitutional so long
46
as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Though
the decision focused on illegal drugs, the Court’s logic might be broad
enough to justify regulation of other non-economic activities—
including perhaps certain kinds of sexual violence.
The government’s second argument is that § 4248 is a necessary
47
and proper exercise of Congress’ penal power. Though the
Constitution does not explicitly provide Congress with the authority
to create and run a penal system, it is well established that the power
to establish a penal system is a necessary and proper extension of
Congress’s authority to establish federal criminal laws under its other
48
enumerated powers. Though the extent of the government’s penal
power is not well-defined, the Supreme Court has indicated
Congress’s penal power includes the power to civilly commit
49
prisoners.
Though Congress can civilly commit prisoners, it is not clear how
broad the power is. Thus far, the Supreme Court has only upheld civil

41. Id. at 616.
42. Id. at 613–14.
43. Id. at 616
44. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2000) (finding that a federal legislative
scheme exists to regulate the sale and use of marijuana).
45. Id.
46. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
47. Brief for the United States, supra note 31, at 22–23.
48. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416–18 (1819).
49. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
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commitment regimes for criminal defendants found incompetent to
50
stand trial and criminal defendants found not guilty by reason of
51
insanity. Initially, the basis for these civil commitment regimes was
quite narrow. In Greenwood v. United States, the Court held that the
government could civilly commit of defendants found incompetent to
stand trial because the federal power to prosecute had not been
52
exhausted. Over the years, however, the Court has indicated that the
government’s power to civilly commit defendants might be broader
than Greenwood indicated. In Jackson v. Indiana, the Court recast
Greenwood as a decision allowing the government to civilly commit
53
mentally incompetent individuals who pose a danger to the public. A
few years later, in Jones v. United States, the Court held that the
federal government could civilly commit defendants found to be not
guilty by reason of insanity in order to protect the defendant and
54
society from potential dangerousness.
C. Conflicting Interpretations of Constitutionality
Other than Comstock, the only circuit to consider the
constitutionality of § 4248 was the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
55
Tom. Tom was serving a federal prison sentence for traveling
between states with the intention of engaging in a sexual act with a
56
minor. Two days before his prison sentence ended, the government
57
petitioned to have Tom civilly committed under §4248.
The Eighth Circuit upheld §4248 as necessary and proper to
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause to prevent interstate
58
sex crimes. Because Tom was convicted under a statute that was
distinctly within Congress’ commerce authority, the Eighth Circuit
held that civil commitment under § 4248 was a rational and
59
appropriate means for effectuating the purpose of that statute. The
Eighth Circuit reasoned that because Congress had the authority to
enact the statute under which Tom was convicted, the “underlying

50. Id. at 375.
51. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
52. Greenwood, 350 U.S at 375.
53. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732–33 (1972).
54. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
55. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009).
56. Id. at 498.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 506.
59. Id. at 504–06 (referring to federal sex crime statute 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c), which
requires interstate travel).
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federal criminal law would be frustrated” absent the ability to prevent
60
the occurrence of sex crimes via the civil commitment provision. The
Eighth Circuit noted that although §4248 itself does not require a
finding that the prisoner will commit a federal sex crime, its limitation
to those who have been charged with a federal crime and have a
propensity for committing sexually violent acts rendered it narrow
enough to be necessary and proper to validly enacted federal sex
61
crime statutes.
IV. HOLDING
In United States v. Comstock, the Fourth Circuit held that the
statute was not based in Congress’s commerce power or justified by
62
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The Fourth Circuit held that Congress did not have the power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate sexual acts, thereby rejecting
the government’s argument that § 4248 is a necessary and proper
extension of Congress’ alleged power to regulate sexually dangerous
63
acts. The court also reasoned that “sexual dangerousness” is in no
way economic activity, therefore the Commerce Clause did not
64
apply.
The Fourth Circuit then held that the civil commitment regime
could not be justified as a necessary and proper extension of
65
Congress’ penal power, reasoning that § 4248 lacked a connection to
federal law because a determination of sexual dangerousness requires
66
no conduct in violation of federal law. In making this holding, the
court held that Congress’s penal power only permitted the
government to civilly commit individuals when it is necessary to 1)
67
prevent federal crimes or 2) preserve the power to prosecute
68
criminals.

60. Id. at 504–05.
61. Id. at 505–06.
62. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir. 2009).
63. Id. at 279–80.
64. Id. at 280.
65. Id. at 281.
66. Id. at 283.
67. See id. at 281–82 (rejecting the Necessary and Proper Clause as justification for
preventing all potential future criminal conduct).
68. See id. (reasoning that because “the Government ha[d] already charged, tried, and
convicted” those subject to § 4248, the power to civilly commit the defendants was exhausted).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. Weaknesses in the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion Under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion takes an overly narrow view of the
civil commitments Congress can authorize under its penal power. As
Jones indicates, the federal government need not show that an inmate
in its custody will commit another federal crime to justify civil
commitment—in some cases civil commitment can be justified by
showing there is reason to believe that the inmate will be a danger to
69
society if released. By rejecting the possibility that Congress can
authorize the attorney general to civilly commit sexually dangerous
offenders, the Fourth Circuit failed to sufficiently consider the more
difficult question raised by the previous Supreme Court cases: could
the protectionist justification that permits civil commitment of those
found not guilty by reason of insanity or incompetent to stand trial be
applied to those who are sane enough to be found guilty and serve
prison time?
The power the government wields under the Necessary and
70
Proper Clause is accepted as broad. Where Congress has the power
to criminalize and punish conduct, it should have the power to pass
71
laws reasonably related to the prevention of regulated conduct. As it
is necessary and proper to the penal power to commit people found
not guilty by reason of mental incapacity in order to protect the
72
community, it is logical that it is also necessary and proper to
commit those found guilty to effectuate the same purpose. The
difference between the civilly committed and the imprisoned seems to
be the level of mental disturbance. If, as in Jones, the defendant is
73
deemed mentally incompetent, he will be civilly committed. If, as in
Comstock, the defendant is competent enough to stand trial and is
74
found guilty, he will serve time in prison. However, this distinction
between competent and incompetent is artificial considered that even
69. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
70. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Houston, E.
and W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S 342, 353 (1914) (noting that the Necessary and Proper
clause has broad scope when used in conjunction with the Commerce Clause); see also N.L.R.B.
v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38 (1937) (stating that the Necessary and Proper
clause’s broad scope is not limited to effectuating the Commerce power).
71. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 504–05 (8th Cir. 2009).
72. Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
73. Id. at 370.
74. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 2009).
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the truly “mentally disturbed” are often deemed “sane” enough to
75
serve prison time for their crimes. If the difference between the
civilly committed and the imprisoned is their level of sanity, not their
level of sexual dangerousness, the community deserves protection
from both groups. Because it is necessary and proper to the penal
power to civilly commit sexually dangerous offenders found
incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity, it is also
necessary and proper to the federal government’s penal power to
commit offenders found guilty in order to protect against sexual
dangerousness.
If § 4248 had actually violated federalist principles by encroaching
on states’ police powers, the Fourth Circuit’s decision would be more
understandable. The Fourth Circuit’s decision is problematic because
it did not give enough weight to § 4248’s limitation to federal
76
prisoners. Section 4248 does not expand the government’s power to
civilly commit people in state custody; what it does is give the federal
government the power to ensure that individuals in federal custody
77
do not pose a danger to society upon release. That the federal
offenders are in lawful federal custody upon their determination of
sexual dangerousness ensures that Congress is not overstepping its
constitutional boundaries by attempting to civilly commit individuals
subject to the states’ police powers.
B. Weaknesses in the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion Under the Commerce
Clause.
In holding that Congress could not enact §4248 under the
Commerce Clause, the Fourth Circuit gave too much weight to the
78
general noneconomic nature of sexual violence. It should have given
79
more weight to the statute’s limited scope and the fact that § 4248 is

75. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (describing the test for
competency which requires that the defendant have a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him and that the defendant have the ability to consult with his lawyer
regarding the proceedings).
76. See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 283 (describing only the lack of limitation to commercial or
interstate activities, but not discussing the statute’s limitation solely to federal prisoners or
detainees).
77. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749–50 (1987) (describing the government’s
interest in preventing crime by arrestees as legitimate and compelling). See also Brief for United
States, supra note 31, at 37–38 (describing the federal government’s obligation to protect society
from those prisoners in its custody).
78. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279.
79. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(a) (West 2009) (limiting the jurisdiction of § 4248 to those
people already in custody of the Bureau of Prisons, those for whom criminal charges have been
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part of a broader federal regulatory scheme. Those two things, when
considered in proper context, might have led the Fourth Circuit to
hold that regulating sexual dangerousness is a Constitutional exercise
of Congress’ commerce power.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision that §4248 was not a proper exercise
of the Commerce power was based on its decision that the logic of
81
Morrison controlled. Even if the logic of Morrison did control, §
4248 contains the requisite jurisdictional limitation, as the statute is
82
limited solely to federal prisoners or detainees. However, Morrison
did not necessarily control in this case because it is possible to
conclude that § 4248 is part of a federal regulatory scheme for sexual
83
dangerousness.
If § 4248 were part of a broader regulatory scheme, then the logic
84
of United States v. Raich would control. The breadth of the Adam
Walsh Act and the Act’s national registration requirements for sex
85
offenders imply that the federal government has an interstate
scheme in place regulating sexual violence. Because the federal
government requires offenders to register their permanent
86
whereabouts, it is clear that the government is keeping track of
sexual offenders. The Act also categorizes sexual offenders according
87
to the severity of their offenses and makes registration information
88
including categorization available to the public. Thus, the Act
requires certain activities of sexual offenders in order to both educate
the public about and decrease sexual violence. When reviewed under
Raich, § 4248 could thus be a justifiable exercise of Congress’
commerce power as Congressional actions regulate the activities of
sexual offenders.

dismissed due to mental conditions, or those whom the Attorney General deemed mentally
incompetent); see also Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279 (focusing on § 4248’s lack of a physical
jurisdictional limitation but not addressing the limitation solely to prisoners or detainees).
80. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 (West 2009) (requiring registration for sex offenders traveling in
interstate commerce).
81. Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279–80.
82. § 4248(a)
83. See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 280 n.6 (stating there is no federal scheme regulating sexual
violence).
84. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23–24 (2005) (describing the need for a broad
interstate regulatory scheme when the activity being regulated is local).
85. See § 2250 (requiring registration for sex offenders traveling in interstate commerce).
86. Id.
87. 42 U.S.C.A § 16911 (West 2009).
88. See § 16918 (mandating that the public have internet access to a database of sexual
offender registry information).
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VI. POSSIBLE DISPOSITIONS
If the Court holds § 4248 unconstitutional, it is likely to do so by
holding that Congress does not have power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate sexual dangerousness. In contrast, if the Court
holds that § 4248 is constitutional, it will likely hold that civil
commitment is a necessary and proper extension of Congress’ penal
power. The Court might also rule that the government cannot civilly
commit federal prisoners, but that the government can civilly commit
those federal inmates deemed incompetent to stand trial because the
government’s power to prosecute has not been exhausted.
A. Ruling for Comstock: §4248 is Unconstitutional.
If the Court deems § 4248 unconstitutional, it is likely to hold that
Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate sexually dangerous acts. Such a holding would rely on United
States v. Morrison, which held that sexual violence is not economic in
89
nature, and thus does not substantially effect interstate commerce.
Because §4248 appears to be an effort to prevent all sex crimes and
90
not just federal sex crimes, using the logic of Morrison to review this
law would inevitably lead to it being struck down. This is true even if
the Court considers Raich, because, unlike illegal drugs, there is not a
91
long history of federal regulation of sexual violence.
B. Ruling for the Government: §4248 Is Constitutional.
If the Court finds that § 4248 is constitutional, it likely will hold
that the power to civilly commit federal offenders is necessary and
proper to the Government’s penal power. Like the accepted authority
92
to provide terms of supervised release, civil commitment authority
stands for the principle that the government has a responsibility to
93
protect the public from people lawfully in its custody. Section 4248
protects the public from federal prisoners likely to commit sexually
violent crimes and serves the same preventative function as a prison
94
sentence. In so holding, the Court will likely reason that a statute
89. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
90. United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2009).
91. See Miles Coleman, supra note 36, at 1226 (discussing the unlikelihood of a
congressional scheme to regulate sexually dangerous people in interstate markets).
92. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 26.
93. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding that “preventing danger
to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal”).
94. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248 (West 2009).
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can be a necessary and proper to a power that is accepted as a
necessary and proper exercise of an enumerated power, such as that
of the federal power to create a penal system.
C. Ruling Based on the Power to Prosecute.
The Court might hold that the exercise of civil commitment
depends on whether the government has exhausted its power to
prosecute. The Supreme Court established in Greenwood v. United
States that an offender can be committed to preserve the federal
power to prosecute where the offender has been deemed mentally
incompetent to stand trial but presents a danger to the interests of the
95
United States. The Court might hold that §4248 lies outside the
scope of Congressional authority only where the federal power to
prosecute has been exhausted. If the Court rules this way, it would
mean that the only sex offenders the government could civilly commit
are those deemed incompetent to stand trial. Such a ruling would
require, however, that the civil commitment serve the purpose of
preserving the power to prosecute and not simply prevent danger to
96
the community. If there were no chance that the offender would
regain his competency, civil commitment would be unconstitutional
under this holding, because the offender’s inability to regain
competency means that the government would not retain any power
97
to prosecute.
D. Disposition
In deciding Comstock, the Supreme Court must find a way to
balance competing interests. On one hand, the Fourth Circuit’s
decision raises concerns about interference into legislative areas
traditionally reserved for states. On the other, the federal
government’s power to prosecute offenders is an important concern
for national security, and consequently a power that has recently
98
expanded. Though federalism has played a prominent role in
99
American history, the trend toward expansion of federal criminal
power points to a ruling in favor of the government.

95. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).
96. See id at 375–76 (limiting the holding to the facts of the case and discussing the
commitment as preserving the federal power to prosecute, not solely a preventative measure).
97. See id. (stating that a slim possibility of recovery is enough to preserve the power to
prosecute).
98. Ehrlich, supra note 1 at 826–27.
99. Id.

